The following are my reflections on the spiritual animal kingdom in the third chapter – Reason – of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (hereafter PhG). These reflections are based on paragraphs 394-418. It is noted that this section is perhaps the height of Hegel’s use of abstract language. Thus, any interpretation or reflection, despite attempts at oversimplifying, almost always slips back into pure abstraction. The reader who is familiar with Hegel – like the unfamiliar – will find this section to be extremely difficult.       

 

In describing the nature of the dialectical movement in Reason, Hegel turns to what he calls the “spiritual animal kingdom” and the “matter in hand.” A good starting point would be to ask: what does the ‘spiritual animal kingdom’ mean or represent and what is its significance? According to British philosopher Michael Inwood, ‘spiritual animal kingdom’ is a term that Hegel uses to refer collectively to artists, specialists, teachers or professors. However, in my view and considering the times in which Hegel lived, I think the usage Hegel has most in mind pertains to professors, or the practitioners of research and scholarship. Here, one can even suggest that he has Fichte, Schelling, and other contemporaries in mind. 

 

To understand the significance or the role of the spiritual animal kingdom in Hegel’s project, it is essential to begin from the very beginning:  At this stage of the dialectic that unfolds throughout the PhG,  consciousness or self-consciousness appears on the scene and “has now grasped the Notion of itself” (¶394). As self-consciousness, it comes to grasp its own individuality or human reality. (Individuality simply means the human individual). Put another way: individuality comes to consider the “real in and for itself” (as Hegel puts it in the title for the section on spiritual animal kingdom). The “real in and for itself” means the world of reality, a world which was once opposed to Reason, i.e. individuality/person, in previous movements of the dialectic. But now, the individual is no longer opposed to the real world, or the real in and for itself is no longer opposed to individuality: “With this Notion of itself, self-consciousness has returned into itself out of those opposed determinations which the category had for it” (¶395). The individual now sees that there are no “opposed determinations”, i.e., things which run contrary to his interests or pursuits. These opposed determinations include the problem of individuality and universality, of end and reality, and of the plurality of categories. As I will show throughout, the oppositions of individual and universal, and end and reality can be overcome through action. (I discuss the plurality of categories elsewhere). 

 

The individual as Reason (or rational self-consciousness) is already in the world, since he finds a world that welcomes him with open arms, having progressed through different social and historical or ahistorical modes. At this stage of the dialectical progression, the individual is merely concerned with expressing himself, since, as I understand it, one can only express him/herself if there is nothing that hinders or opposes expression: “This, being now absolutely certain of its reality, no longer seeks only to realize itself as End in antithesis to the reality which immediately confronts it but, on the contrary, has the category as such for the object of its consciousness” (¶394). This suggests that the individual now considers himself to be a part of the world and/or that the world exists for the expression of his individuality or individual self-expression. But does this mean that the individual cannot express herself in a world of “opposed determinations”, i.e., that contains things other than self-conscious individuality? Does not the act of the individual’s mere movement in the dialectic imply that even if she is constrained or confronted with oppositions, she still moves nevertheless? On this point, it seems, Hegel is silent. Yet, Hegel’s chief concern is to show that the individual is not aware, or rather, individuality is not sure of itself as pure individuality. Individuality, thus, must evaluate itself in order to know itself. This evaluation takes the form of action, or the individual setting a task for herself. (Here, Hegel is anticipating the “matter in hand”, which I will turn to shortly) .

 

The individual’s goal is not to be merely an individual, an in-itself, since he is already an individual or individuality. Instead, the individual wants to be certain of himself and the world in which he lives and to see that that world actually exists as he takes it to be. Since individuality is the in-itself and the world in which it acts is the world for-itself, individuality is here confronted with the opposed determinations of individuality (or particularity) and universality (the world other than itself). However, since self-consciousness or the individual considers the real world as the world of individuality, i.e., the world that allows for his individual action or expression, universality is already introduced in the dialectic. But this universal is no longer a distinction between the for-itself and the in-itself. Thus, striving to know itself through self-evaluation, individuality must also come to know the new universality that it is here confronted with. As Hegel points out: individuality is no longer opposed to the world. Thus, in coming to know and express itself and understand the universality that has now come on the stage, individuality must engage in action. To act is for the individual to make an appearance or manifestation or expression, but in manifesting itself externally or outside itself, individuality is only expressing what its nature is internally. It is “a transition from a state of not being seen to one of being seen” (¶396). Here, Hegel seems to be suggesting that it is through action that individuality expresses or transitions from its basic nature, “in-itself”, to be “being seen” or “for-itself”. Whatever action the individual carries out only expresses what he has thought about. Individuality, thus, exists as an act, and therefore, seeks first and foremost to actualize its essence, through action. In other words, action is the bringing “out into the daylight” of what is “implicit”. Hence, the individual takes himself to be the world, or that the world only exists for him alone. 

 

 

In the spiritual animal kingdom, action becomes essential, and hence, is the object of individuality. An individual can only know what he is by realizing himself through action. Action or work is what brings about the unity of the individual, as subject, and the world, as object. As animals or human animals, every individual starts or begins with an action that is self-imposed, or that is only meant to make explicit its implicit nature: “This intrinsically real individuality is at first again a single and specific one” (¶397). But at this stage, the action or work of individuality is “an abstract, universal reality lacking filling and content”. It is merely an abstract form. But being somehow abstract, action or the task at hand, that is, the “matter in hand”, is what is permanent and solid (¶398). The individual may have capacities or abilities, interests or talents, means and ends, but it is only through action that all these moments come to be and then vanish again. This is what, I think, Hegel means when he says action is an “abstract, universal reality”. However, by “reality” and as Hegel notes at the end of 396, the action that individuality carries out, is itself a “content”: “Admittedly, it is a determinate content, but it is only a content at all in so far as we consider the in-itself in isolation” (¶399). Furthermore, it is content in the sense that it has the “thing” which it works on, but because individuality is only at this point concerned with its implicit nature, it still has an abstract form or universal, because the thing or thing to be worked or acted on – the actuality of self-conscious individuality – is a general predicate of which the actions of other individualities can be applied: “as action; it is thus the universal as against the specific character of the work done” (¶402). Hence, the thing becomes for each individuality and all individualities.

 

As spiritual animals, then, each human individuality is working on its own essence or work or project through its action. This implies that they are already in the realm of “spiritual essence” or “spiritual animal kingdom”, which refers to the community, but which at this stage of the dialectic, is not yet fully manifested (Hegel will pick up on this in the fourth chapter, Spirit). Because each individuality is only preoccupied with its own “matter in hand”, by which Hegel seems to mean the individual project that is for individuality alone, individuality, thus, finds itself in a spiritual animal kingdom, where individuality’s absorption into itself is similar to the simple animal notion of self, which does not go beyond itself. Thus, Hegel compares it with “indeterminate animal life” (¶398). However, individuality is still determinate: “Admittedly, it is a determinate content, but it only a content at all in so far as we consider the in-itself in isolation…however, negativity is a determinateness only in being; but action itself is nothing else but negativity. Therefore, when individuality acts, determinateness is dissolved in the general process of negativity or in the sum total of every determinateness” (¶399). These passages contain a lot, and Hegel goes on to elaborate or repeat the claims he makes.

 

It has been stated previously that action or work is really individuality’s way of being certain of itself. Without action, individuality is simply for it-self. But as active individuality, the for-itself and the in-itself achieves a unity, since in coming “out into the daylight”, individuality brings out what is implicit in it (the for-itself) and its work in the world becomes the in-itself, thus in-itself is nothing but the objective world. In this unity, then, action seems to be the essence of individuality and objective reality. To put it in another way, Hegel argues that individuality is an original nature, as was stated above. This means that individuality without action remains in itself. If this is so, why does Hegel claim that in this state, individuality still has a “determinate content”? For Hegel, it has a determinate content because its nature exists in-itself or if, as he puts it, the in-itself is considered in isolation (¶399), and because negativity is within the in-itself. Before action, when individuality is regarded as a being-in-itself, individuality is a particularity or a particular nature, i.e., it has a content that is only specific to it. But since action is negativity, by acting, individuality itself becomes what is explicit for it. It considers its action as real, and it is in this that individuality comes to see the world as an object or what is objective for it. Thus, in the spiritual animal kingdom, individuality takes its action to be an objective reality (¶415).

 

Yet, Hegel wants to show that, individuality’s claim to an objective world through its action is relative and unsatisfactory, for since each individuality will have its own “matter in hand” having been called or inspired by another individuality: “A consciousness that opens up a subject-matter soon learns that others hurry along like flies to freshly poured-out milk, and want to busy themselves with it” (¶418). What individuality thought to be its objective reality is really, then, its “own affair” (ibid). Because each person or individuality has the subject-matter which it acts on, the work of individuality, then, is open to the praise, critique or judgment of others (¶416). Therefore, individuality will try to act on the “matter in hand” in a way so that it can be viewed by others as honest: “Consciousness is called honest when it has on the one hand attained to the idealism which the ‘matter in hand’ expresses” (¶412). However, this is a false or superficial honesty because individuality will attempt to show that it is part of the ‘matter in hand’ as others when in fact it is not or has done nothing to contribute to the subject-matter. It will claim that even if it does nothing, it at least inspired or stimulated others by [purporting] that it really was part of the matter in hand (¶417). As soon as other individualities realize that a particular individuality is not being honest, individuality views another as engaging in “hypocrisy”. Thus, Hegel seems to suggest, the action of individuality to other individualities is nothing but an act of self-elevation: “It is, then, equally a deception of oneself and of others if it is pretended that what one is concerned with is the ‘matter in hand’ alone” (¶418). Thus, this self-seeking action is simply deception.  Each individuality is deceiving while it is also being deceived.    

 

Finally, it would seem that action is just the “matter in hand”. But this confusion is so because Hegel himself does not distinguish the one from the other, or does not show any similarity. Here, I suggest, that the “matter in hand” is action, but an action that is highly self-absorbed. As I have argued just now, each individual takes their mere acting or action as honesty of purpose, that he or she too has something that he or she is working on. But as it turns out, this is deception, because each individual is really engaging in a task that is self-serving. Even when the individual asks other individuals for help, he or she does so with some selfish motive, because his action only benefits him alone. The ‘matter in hand’ is what Hegel seems to be using to describe such a situation. However, Hegel says the “matter in hand” is universal. Initially, individuality, having gone beyond the “opposed determinations” which it first encountered in the world, came to see the objective world as its own world. In other words, individuality no longer confronts an in-itself world in contradistinction to individuality for itself. It sees itself as the expression of the objective world and the world as simply the world of individuality. It, thus, decides to act, it develops its own project, ‘subject-matter’ or ‘matter in hand’. Then, it realizes that others come hurrying to the matter in hand or that other individualities also have the subject-matter. It had taken the matter in hand to be for itself, or attempted to keep it at first. But as soon as individuality acts, as soon as it makes explicit what is implicit, it comes to realize that the ‘matter in hand’ is universal as other individuals are contributing to it, or taking part in their own individual actions. To this extent, deception itself is given a universal designation, so that whenever individuals act at any time in any given place, they only pretend to be acting for the collective but, in reality, are only concerned with their own projects. Now, I suggest that even if everyone has some interest or motive, which is inherently good because everyone wants what is good, the combination of various motives will create a better world, one in which individuality will no longer be confronted with any oppositions. But Hegel will have more to say beyond the ‘spiritual animal kingdom.’